Opinions — Thursday, September 10, 2026

In In re TextNow Inc., the Federal Circuit dismissed the appeal from the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board under Fed. R. App. P. 42(b) based on the parties' agreement. Each side was ordered to bear its own costs.

The Federal Circuit affirmed dismissal of Guymon's challenge to the USPTO Director's patent term adjustment determination for U.S. Patent No. 10,943,030, which claims a method for creating secure electronic documents. Guymon sought 2,327 days of PTA but received only 1,525 days; after the Director denied reconsideration, Guymon filed suit under 35 U.S.C. § 154(b)(4)(A), which requires filing within 180 days. His complaint was due September 25, 2023, but because the Eastern District of Virginia prohibits pro se electronic filing, his emailed complaint was not accepted and his mailed complaint was not received until September 27, 2023.

The court held that Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(d)(4)—which bars clerks from refusing filings "solely because [they are] not in the form prescribed"—does not encompass impermissible methods of filing like email, but rather refers to content aspects such as caption requirements. Because Rule 5(d)(3)(B)(i) permits pro se electronic filing only by court order or local rule, and Guymon had neither on the deadline date, his email did not constitute a valid filing. The court rejected Guymon's argument that dismissal on statute-of-limitations grounds at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage was premature, finding the untimeliness apparent from the complaint's face and that Guymon failed to establish entitlement to equitable tolling, which requires diligent pursuit of rights and extraordinary circumstances rather than his own neglect in waiting until the last day to discover filing requirements.

The Federal Circuit reversed in part and vacated in part a judgment from the Eastern District of Michigan in Versata Software, LLC v. Ford Motor Company, involving claims of trade secret misappropriation under the Defend Trade Secrets Act and Michigan Uniform Trade Secrets Act, as well as breach of contract. The district court had granted Ford's motion for judgment as a matter of law following a jury verdict, reducing a $22.4 million trade secret damages award to zero and an $82.3 million breach of contract award to $3. The Federal Circuit held that the district court abused its discretion by categorically precluding Versata from seeking unjust enrichment damages for trade secret misappropriation, finding that both the DTSA and MUTSA expressly provide plaintiffs the statutory right to recover such damages—not merely actual losses or reasonable royalty damages tied to licensing history. The court vacated the trade secret damages reduction and remanded for a new trial with instructions to reconsider two damages models previously excluded solely because they were not based on the parties' licensing history. The court also reversed the reduction of breach of contract damages and reinstated the full jury award, finding the district court applied Michigan law erroneously. The court affirmed denial of Ford's motion for judgment as a matter of law on trade secret misappropriation liability.

The decision clarifies that trade secret plaintiffs possess a statutory right to pursue unjust enrichment damages under uniform trade secrets acts, rejecting the proposition that prior licensing relationships categorically limit recovery to negotiated royalty rates. The Federal Circuit's interpretation aligns with Tenth and Eleventh Circuit precedent recognizing unjust enrichment as "separate and distinct" from licensing-based measures, and holds that wrongdoers "must assume the risk" of potentially higher damages by misappropriating rather than licensing. The court distinguished Sixth Circuit decisions (Vitro Corp. and Mid-Michigan) that upheld royalty-based awards, clarifying those cases approved particular damage calculations on their facts but did not establish mandatory limitations on damage theories. By instructing the district court to reconsider excluded damages models on remand, the decision signals that district courts may not impose categorical restrictions on statutorily authorized remedies even when parties have licensing history, though they retain authority to exclude specific models as unreliable under Daubert standards on other grounds.