Kangol LLC v. Hangzhou Chuanyue Silk Import & Export Co., Ltd.
The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded the district court's denial of defendant's motion to vacate a default judgment in a trademark counterfeiting action. Plaintiff Kangol LLC sued defendant Hangzhou Chuanyue Silk Import & Export Co., Ltd., a Chinese e-commerce vendor, for trademark infringement, counterfeiting, unfair competition, false designation of origin, and trademark dilution under 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114(1), 1125(a), and 1125(c), alleging unauthorized use of Kangol's kangaroo logo. After the district court authorized service by email pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(f)(3) and Hangzhou failed to appear, the court entered default judgment. Hangzhou subsequently moved to vacate under Rule 60(b)(4), arguing the judgment was void for lack of personal jurisdiction because email service in China violates the Hague Service Convention. The district court denied the motion, concluding the Convention permits email service in China. The Seventh Circuit held that the Hague Service Convention, where applicable, exclusively governs permissible service methods and prohibits email service in China, but remanded for the district court to determine the threshold question of whether the Convention applies at all given that Hangzhou's address may have been unknown under Article 1.
The decision resolves a recurring split among district courts handling Schedule A e-commerce counterfeiting litigation over whether the Hague Service Convention permits email service. The court held that the Convention's text and structure establish a closed universe of permissible service methods, relying on the Supreme Court's characterization of Article 1's "shall apply" language as a "model exclusivity provision" in Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale v. U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Iowa and subsequent reaffirmations in Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk and Water Splash, Inc. v. Menon. The court reasoned that Articles 11 and 19, which address service methods not "provided for" in the Convention, would be superfluous unless the Convention enumerated exclusive methods, and that interpreting the Convention's silence as permitting unenumerated methods would render the approved methods meaningless. While the court declined to resolve whether Article 10(a)'s reference to "postal channels" encompasses email, it held that China's objection to Article 10(a) service forecloses email service regardless, aligning with recent Second and Third Circuit decisions rejecting email service where the destination state objects to Article 10.