Kesters Merchandising Display International v. SurfaceQuest
The Tenth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for SurfaceQuest on Kesters' Lanham Act § 43(a)(1)(B) false advertising claim, holding that Kesters failed to establish injury—whether presumed or actual. Kesters Merchandising Display International alleged that SurfaceQuest misrepresented Kesters' MicroLite lightweight construction material as SurfaceQuest's own product in photographs, videos, and samples shown to customers. The court held that even assuming SurfaceQuest's advertisements were literally false, Kesters could not benefit from a presumed-injury rule because it failed to establish that Kesters and SurfaceQuest were the only significant participants in the relevant market. The court further held that Kesters presented no evidence of actual injury causally connected to the false advertising, noting specifically that Kesters offered no proof that SurfaceQuest won the Hy-Vee health market project Kesters lost, that SurfaceQuest showed its marketing materials to Hy-Vee, or that Hy-Vee ever saw the allegedly deceptive materials.
The decision turns on two evidentiary failures that false advertising practitioners must note. First, the court applied Vitamins Online's two-prong test for presumed injury, requiring proof that the defendant materially inflated its product's value and that plaintiff and defendant are the only significant market participants—a narrow exception the court construed strictly by requiring evidence of cross-elasticity of demand to define the relevant market, not mere product similarity. Kesters' affidavit addressing product similarities failed because reasonable interchangeability depends on substitutability measured by cross-elasticity, not physical resemblance. Second, on actual injury, the court demanded proof of a causal chain linking the false advertising to lost sales, rejecting Kesters' bid-loss theory where no evidence showed the defendant obtained the project, presented the false materials to the customer, or that the customer ever viewed them. The decision underscores that literal falsity alone cannot carry a § 43(a)(1)(B) claim without market-definition evidence supporting a presumption or concrete proof tracing competitive injury to the defendant's deceptive statements.